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Abstract 
The paper examines the concept and practice of Joint Development Agreement (JDA) as a modality upon which 
Nigeria and Cameroon can jointly and efficiently utilise their offshore resources to secure future demands and 
supply of energy resources in the Gulf of Guinea. Gulf of Guinea is now regarded as one of the world’s most 
important oil and gas producing region. Exploration and development activities in the region have increased 
significantly following the discovery of enormous reserves. The paper argues that the conflict between Nigeria 
and Cameroon was stimulated by the expectation of offshore resources in the area, which finally ended in 
litigation at International Court of Justice (ICJ). The combined effects of ICJ’s judgement in 2002 and the 
continuous demands of energy resources by both parties made it possible to consider alternative arrangement. The 
paper further argues that the concept of JDA is currently utilised in almost all the regions of the world either as an 
alternative to boundary delimitation or in some instances in addition to maritime boundary. The paper suggests 
that both States can benefit from the concept considering the oil and gas deposits straddling their delimited 
maritime boundaries as delimitation is not necessary a panacea to offshore resources conflicts. The paper however 
relies on primary and secondary sources of data and the analysis is descriptive. It recommends for presence of 
political will, strong arrangements on sharing of resources and regard to precedents in the region which plays a 
vital role for any meaningful arrangement.      
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1   Introduction 
The paper examines the concept of JDA as a modality upon which Nigeria and Cameroon can jointly and 
efficiently utilise their offshore resources in a bid to secure future demands and supply of energy resources in the 
Gulf of Guinea. It is quite apparent nowadays; society is highly dependent on oil and gas deposits for energy 
generation and transmission, mobility and transportation, food supply, information and communication, health 
delivery and countless other services; bringing as a result a particular concern towards the discovery of new oil 
and gas deposits to ensure energy security. With yet no substantial effort at promoting reliable alternative to oil, 
the commodity has remained politically volatile and strategic in domestic and global economy and political 
sphere.1  
  In this regard, there is continuous demand for energy resources from offshore as a result of growing concern for 
limited production from onshore oil reserves, whose production remains for more than two decades at peak2. 
Hence, states around the world have used every effort to ensure more energy resources, a factor which resulted in 
offshore oil production to become extremely important in the global energy supply3. According to United State of 
America (USA) Geological Survey 2000 Petroleum Assessment, undiscovered offshore oil and gas deposits are 
estimated at 306 billion barrels of crude oil and 95 billion barrels of natural gas liquid, accounting for 47% of 
total undiscovered oil in the world. 
However, Coastal States’ claim for offshore oil and gas deposits in an area of overlapping claims renders it more 
difficult to settle boundary delimitation and fuels territorial disputes  over islands of which waters are said to be 
in-rich in oil and gas deposits. The continuous claims of continental shelves by the states presented international 
maritime boundary disputes between states, as well as difficulties in oil and gas deposits development and 
exploration. These difficulties were as a result of the fact that International Oil Companies (IOCs) are not willing 
to invest in a disputed area considering the enormous risks involved. In other to accommodate the claims of 
coastal states over offshore resources resulted in the codification of the provisions relating to Continental Shelf 
in 1958 at the Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
                                           
1
 F. Allen, ‘Oil and Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Reflections on the External and Domestic Linkages’. 
(2012) 5 Journals of Sustainable Development 4 132. 
2
 S.K. KIM, ’The Joint Development of Offshore Energy Resources: Prospects and Issues in East China.’ 
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1982 (UNCLOS)1. UNCLOS recognised that states are very much concerned about offshore resources, a factor 
which makes it difficult for states to agree on boundary delimitation which usually resulted in moratorium in the 
disputed area, it then provided thus:     
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, 
the states concerned, in the spirit of understanding 
and cooperation shall make every effort to enter 
into provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final 
agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final delimitation.2 
Blake and Swarbrick maintained that states are usually found in boundary dispute either because the boundary has 
not been delimited or because the oil and gas deposits straddling a boundary line is fugacious in nature.3  Any 
attempt to develop the overlapping area by one state gave rise to armed conflicts with neighbouring states and 
sometimes ended up in litigation. However, the growing domestic needs for energy resources led to negotiations 
to develop offshore oil and gas in a mutually beneficial manner. Many states around the world came to agreement 
for joint development of offshore oil and gas deposits, putting aside for the mean time conflicting maritime 
boundary and territorial claims4. In other cases, states jointly develop agreed territorial area for maximum benefit 
of natural resources contain therein despite delimitation. Nigeria and Cameroon situation falls under the later 
arrangement.  
This paper is divided into six sections. The first section is the introduction while the second section deals with the 
strategic importance of Gulf of Guinea. The third section concerns with the basic concept and legality of JDA. 
The management of Joint Development Zone (JDZ) and model arrangement of the JDA are discussed in section 
four. We examine the importance and precedents of JDA in the area while stressing the need for political will by 
parties concerned to actualise the agreement in section five and conclude in section six. 
It is important to states that the paper relies on primary and secondary sources of data and the analysis is 
descriptive and the discussion now turns to economic importance of Gulf of Guinea. 
2 Gulf of Guinea 
2.1   Economic Importance of Gulf of Guinea   
 Gulf of Guinea is regarded as one of the world’s most important oil and gas producing region. Exploration and 
development activities in the region have increased significantly following the discovery of enormous reserves5. 
More than 5 billion barrels of oil were discovered in the deepwater (water depth of about 650 feet) between 1996 
and 1997 with a 200% production replacement rate, the Gulf of Guinea is now regarded as the world’s leading 
region in terms of oil reserves’ renewal.6 The Gulf of Guinea is increasingly assuming influence role in global 
politics, trade and investment. Now, amidst threats of energy insecurity due to crisis in the Persian Gulf and 
increasing concern for securing reliable source of supply by oil importing countries, especially by the USA, the 
Gulf of Guinea has come to the fore once more as a region with great potential for providing a significant part of 
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24 Articles 74/83 (3) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 
December, 
1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994, available at http://www.UN.org/depts/los. (Accessed on 
20 September, 2012).  
5Ibid. 
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 G.H. Blake and R.E. Swarbrick, ‘Hydrocarbons and International Boundaries: A Global Overview’ in G. 
Blake et al. (Eds).Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospect (Kluwer Law International, 1998) at 3.  
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 Besides joint development, which is by far the most widely used form in practice, the other forms of 
provisional arrangements pending delimitation are not based upon joint zones, but upon provisional lines or 
upon a de facto boundary. See Sun Pyo Kim, Maritime Delimitation and Interim Arrangements in North 
East Asia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 96–97. 
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the answer for emerging fears of global energy insecurity. Allen pointed out the importance of Gulf of Guinea to 
global energy security when he succinctly put it; thus:  
 
Trends in the discourse on the value of the Gulf 
of Guinea is fast moving in the direction of its 
role in meeting global energy needs, especially, 
the United States, China and India within the 
context of global and regional politics of oil. 
This growing interest in the Gulf of Guinea is 
now deceptively rationalized by the development 
vacuum in the major oil producing areas of the 
region. As a result, mutual security interest of the 
importing and exporting countries is advanced by 
western scholars and politicians as the region is 
expected to play more roles in meeting the 
energy needs of oil importing nations in the years 
ahead.1 
 However, like any other region in the world, the Gulf of Guinea is also faced with number of maritime boundary 
conflicts mostly located in the Atlantic Ocean and bounded by the five West African coastal states of Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao-Tome and Principe (STP). Considering the manner in which some 
of these unresolved maritime boundary disputes around the world have obstructed the offshore oil and gas 
development, one commentator observed, ‘all around the world millions of acres of territory are off  limits of 
exploration because international boundary have not been agreed’ 2 . In order to facilitate security and the 
development of offshore oil and gas deposits in the sub-region, Nigeria and 7 other African countries concluded 
the creation of Gulf of Guinea Commission in 2001 through the Gulf of Guinea Treaty which has done a lot in 
providing stability and confidence in the future of oil and gas exploitation in the region among respective 
governments and investors in the region3. However, according to the secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission 
Mr Trovoado, ‘the commission failed to carry out its primary mandate of securing the energy resource of the 
region and ensuring that these were peacefully exploited in ways that would provide the best possible advantage to 
the people of the region because of its challenges’.4     
These countries’ economies heavily depend on oil sector, particularly Nigeria whose oil according to Oil and Gas 
Journal had an estimated 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of January, 2011. Significant reserves are 
found along the country’s Niger Delta and offshore in the Bight of Benin, the Gulf of Guinea and the Bight of 
Bonny and accounts for over 95 percent of export earnings and up to 80% of the government revenue. However, 
Nigeria’s oil production is declining daily, a factor which made Nigeria’s Department of Petroleum Resources 
projected that at the current rate of depletion of about 763.2 million barrels per year; Nigeria’s crude oil reserves 
will not last beyond 35 years.5 Therefore, Nigeria must however look elsewhere for oil resources to secure the 
future demand and supply by effective utilisation of its territorial waters and continental shelves in the Gulf of 
Guinea through the concept of JDA for the mutual benefits of all the states concern. The successful 
implementation of joint development between Nigeria and STP, although initially experiencing some level of 
difficulties, prove that such sophisticated arrangement can be successfully implemented in the Gulf of Guinea.    
It is also important to note that the rising global quest for oil in the Gulf of Guinea is not merely to satisfy energy 
security needs of key oil importing countries, but also to protect their investments in the oil sector in the region 
and seek new investment opportunities; all of which are fundamental to the economic security of home 
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governments of the IOCs. This means that ensuring uninterrupted production of oil is paramount to the security 
of the Nigerian state.  
However, the lack of ability to exercise effective control over maritime area has made it difficult for Gulf of 
Guinea states to enjoy the full benefits of important energy resources in their continental shelves. The potentials 
in the area are being undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. 
Rather than contributing to stability and economic prosperity for states in this sub-region, pervasive insecurity in 
the area resulted in more than $2 billion in annual financial losses, significantly constrained investment and 
economic prospects, growing crime and potentially adverse political consequence. 
Despite the inability by the Gulf of Guinea states to effectively utilise their resources, the current demand for 
Africa’s oil, especially from West Africa, is expected to increase as the political significance of the oil continues 
to grow between USA and the Persian Gulf, where long lasting political issues of mutual interests in relations 
between the USA, Western European nations and the region have remained relevant for key economic and oil 
production and supply decision. In this regard, Gulf of Guinea, where Africa’s oil concentrated is extremely 
relevant in its importance of providing the haven of sort for meeting global energy security need. The paper will 
now looks at the concept of JDA.      
3 The Basic Concept of Joint Development Agreement  
3.1 Definition of Joint Development Agreement (JDA) 
 It is worthy to note that States around the world recognised that boundary delimitation is not necessary a panacea 
for disputes over oil and gas deposits, as petroleum reserves which are fugacious in nature respect no national 
boundary. Therefore, the concept of JDA for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits in disputed 
International maritime boundaries emerged during the second half of 1950s. 1  The concept has become 
increasingly accepted as a constructive means in settling difficult disputes involving International maritime 
boundaries claims. It ‘has been endorsed as an appropriately practical and legally viable measure for the 
development, exploration for, or exploitation of, natural resources where boundary delimitation has proved 
difficult...’2 The concept is currently utilised in almost all the regions of the world either as an alternative to 
boundary delimitation or in some instances in addition to maritime boundary.3  
Anderson remarked that:  
The solution of a joint area may be second best to 
an agreed boundary; but a joint area may well be 
better than seeing a dispute remain unresolved and 
possibly grow more serious. The governments may 
prefer a compromise to a defeat in litigation.  An 
effective treaty providing for joint development 
may allow the industry to work and produce 
benefit for many years in an area which would 
otherwise have remained blighted by dispute over 
jurisdiction. 'Half a loaf is better than no bread', as 
the saying goes.4 
Therefore, JDA, its major advantages lie first in the fact that it gives some level of assurance and guarantee to the 
IOCs that their capital investments are not under any kind of risk.5 It also provides the much needed revenue to 
the states. Generating benefits through the establishment of JDZ gives evidently a better chance for states dealing 
with their demand over oil and gas deposits, their economic development and most of all; benefiting from areas 
which may otherwise remain unproductive. 
                                           
1
T.A. Mensah, ‘Joint Development as an Alternative Legal Arrangement in Offshore Maritime Disputes’ in 
Rainer Lagoni and Daniel Vignes (eds), Maritime Dispute. (Koninklijke Brill N.V  2006) 146. 
2
  Ibid 
3
Example of JDA as alternative to boundary delimitation is Japan-South Korea Joint Development 
Agreement of 1974.   
4
 D H Anderson, ‘Strategies for Dispute Resolution: Negotiating Joint Agreements’ in G. Blake et al., 
(Eds)., Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospect (Kluwer Law International, London 1998) 475. 
5
 F. Shihata and W.T. Onorato, ‘Joint Development of International Petroleum Resources in Undefined and 
Disputed Areas’ in G Blake Others  (Eds)., Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospect (Kluwer Law 
International,1998) 434. 
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The concept received much attention from legal writers all over the world. But yet, it has no generally acceptable 
definition. However, there is general consensus among writers that JDA derives its legality from sources of 
international law ranging from conventional to customary international law. In this regard, Miyoshi notes that the 
concept of JDA is not understood or used in a uniform way.1 In his words; JDA is ‘an intergovernmental 
arrangement of provisional nature, designed for functional purposes of joint exploration for and/or exploitation of 
hydrocarbons resources of the sea bed beyond territorial sea.’2  
Shihata and Onarato define JDA as ‘a procedure under which boundary disputes are set aside, without prejudice 
to the validity of the conflicting claims, and the interested states agree, instead, to jointly explore and exploit and 
to share any hydrocarbons found in the area subject to overlapping claims.’3 According to Lagoni, JDA is ‘the 
cooperation between states with regard to the exploration for and exploitation of certain deposits, fields or 
accumulation of non-living resources which either extend across a boundary or lie in an area overlapping claims.4  
To Townsend-Gault, JDA means ‘a decision by one or more countries to pool any rights they may have over a 
given area and, to a greater or lesser degree, undertake some form of joint management for the purpose of 
exploring for and exploiting offshore minerals.’ He however, maintains that each JDZ must be comprised of 
areas which would otherwise be beyond the jurisdiction (if not the claims) of the parties.5 Similarly, Gao defines 
JDA as “the common exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction based on an international agreement between 
governments of two or more concerned states for the purpose exploitation and apportionment of a potential 
natural resource in an overlapping area of territorial dispute pending a final delimitation.”6 
The definition offered by Lagoni encompasses the Gulf of Guinea situation to the extent that the resources lie 
across an agreed boundary where the two states agreed to develop jointly. Similarly, legal writers usually 
maintained two instances where the concept of JDA may be applied. According to Miyoshi, the two types of 
JDA regimes are: first, where boundary delimitation has been shelved and the other regime is where the 
boundary has been delimited.7 Other writers like Robson, Bundy and Ong agreed with these two types of JDA.8 
Most of the writers describe joint development as provisional, but Lagoni maintains that the duration of the 
arrangement depends on the agreement of the parties, who may choose to make it permanent. This description 
fits Churchill's first two classification of joint development9. 
 
 These basic principles and the legal features of JDA identified above are applicable in the Nigeria-Cameroon 
context. The first two types of Churchill's classification, i.e., JDZ as alternative to a boundary and JDZ as an 
additional element to a boundary line, will fit the Nigeria-Cameroon context. The first type is currently in use by 
Nigeria and STP on their continental shelves. 
It is important to note that in establishing JDA, political will of the participating states play a key role as the 
success of the arrangement depend on it. Even the establishment of a regional framework and analogous 
provisions in bilateral agreements that are geared towards cooperation between states in the exploitation of their 
shared natural resources cannot be expected to provide concrete results without the political will from all the 
governments involved.10 The discussion now turns to the question of JDA structure. 
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3.2  Structure of Joint Development Agreement 
3.2.1  Sharing of Resources 
Sharing of resources is one of the major issues that must be dealt with from the beginning. Usually, the benefits 
of the area are the main concern of the parties, as such both states want to know with certainty the proportion the 
resources should be shared.1 In principle, on the basis of attributing equality to each claimant, there is a good 
prima facie argument for the benefits being shared equally.2 In practice, parties in the course of negotiation due 
considered other factors which affect the proportions of states’ shares. Possibly, in the course of negotiations, 
concessions concerning respective shares will be made by the states, either in recognition of the weakness of their 
claim, or as a result of other political considerations.3  
According to Lerer, the allocation of shares between states might end up recognising the fact that states are 
extremely reluctant to let go claims to territory or maritime boundaries, there may be less of a political problem 
regarding the sharing of the resources discovered.4 In Nigeria-STP Agreement of 2001, parties agreed on 60% 
and 40% respectively. 
3.2.2  Area of the Zone 
The most important issue for JDA is the geographical definition of the zone to which it applies.5 Usually in the 
context of maritime boundary dispute, the area of the zone is area of overlapping claims of the two states either 
publicly claimed or claimed in diplomatic negotiation. During the negotiations, there will be some level of 
compromise in relation to such claims, to an extent that a party might abandon areas where its claim is not strong. 
In Nigeria-STP Agreement 2001 the parties acknowledged ‘the existence of an area of overlapping maritime 
claims as to the exclusive economic zones living between their respective territories (‘the Area‘) taking Article 
74(3) of the UNCLOS convention into account, and accordingly agreed to constitute by the present Treaty a joint 
development zone for the area.’6 Therefore, area of the zone to which JDA is apply, normally consist of at least 
part of the area claimed by both states in diplomatic negotiations if not actually in public.  
3.2.3  Applicable Law 
It is important to determine which rules and regulations apply in the JDZ. In this regard, this will normally 
depend on the model for the management of development in the area adopted by the participating states.  Under 
the single state management, the rules and regulations of the managing state will likely apply all the way; and in 
the joint venture model, that of the state which granted concession to the operator governs the area. However, in 
joint Authority, different rules and regulations will have to be dealt with separately.7  
Furthermore, parties must determine which petroleum regime is applicable. The parties can agreed on state 
petroleum regime to be applicable or the agreement will set a new regulations. However, reaching agreement for 
a unified petroleum regime for oil and gas activities including procedure for awarding concessions might be very 
difficult, more especially in a situation where both states have systems which are remarkably different, for 
example, where one state practices participation through production sharing contracts, whilst other state has 
licensing and royalty system.8   
3.2.4  Subject of Joint Development Agreement 
The JDA must specify the resources which will be the subject of the arrangement. However, the need for oil and 
gas deposits usually serve as a cornerstone for the establishment of JDZ, which  reason would have been the 
motivating factor for putting aside the dispute pending final delimitation. 
Therefore, in many instances, the JDZ is specifically set up for the purpose of exploiting oil and gas deposits. But 
it is at the discretion of parties to agree on joint development in relation to other resources, living and non- living 
                                                                                                                              
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 207 at 221. Also see Okafor (n14) 510 – 511 where the author 
discussed other twelve factors to be considered in establishing JDA as agreed by writers. 
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resources.1 In practice, other resources could be dealt with extensively as oil and gas deposits, for instance, 
agreement on fisheries between the Republic of Korea and Japan, which was signed on 28 November 1998. 
 
3.2.5  Dispute Resolution  
It is always important for parties to include provisions in their agreement as to how dispute will be dealt with. 
The dispute resolution clause in an agreement need to be carefully and thoughtfully considered especially where 
the relationship between the parties prior to the agreement was not cordial. In some agreements the parties 
normally leave dispute resolution to diplomacy, while in some the parties resort for third party settlement, 
through either binding arbitration or resort to appropriate tribunal. 
In this regard, Nigeria and Cameroon must recognised the fact that both states were engaged in wars and conflicts 
prior to litigation at International Court Journal (ICJ) and in the last three decades gone through most of the 
dispute resolution mechanisms recommended by Article 33 of the United Nation charter. Therefore, arbitration 
will be the best option for the states as it is increasingly becoming acceptable means of dispute resolution of 
choice in international oil and gas contracts.2 
3.2.6 Preservation of Existing Rights 
It is important for the JDA to provide a provision for the preservation of parties’ claims or rights in the JDZ. The 
fact that parties agreed to jointly develop area of overlapping claims or straddling between the parties does not 
mean that claimants relinquishes its claimed rights in the area. 
In practice, the JDA provides for “without prejudice” clause which facilitates states engagement in the 
development of offshore resources, by setting aside the delimitation dispute.3 
3.2.7  Duration and Termination 
One question that generates much concern from the legal writers is whether joint development is a permanent 
solution to a boundary dispute or it is an interim measure taking by states in utilising the resources in a disputed 
area for a given time? Lagoni while discussing Articles 74/83 of UNCLOS maintains that JDA is one of the 
interim measures envisaged therein, however, ‘the parties of course, are free to change any provisional 
arrangement into a permanent one by agreement, for example, by maintaining a joint development zone after the 
final delimitation of that area’.4  
Gao states that JDA is transitional in nature as it directly deals with resource development in a disputed area 
between the states rather than resolution of dispute per se. He however, acknowledges that states may wish to 
maintain the same arrangement even when final delimitation is reached, transforming same into a permanent 
arrangement.5  
According to Onarato and Shihata, whether JDA is temporary or permanent in duration, its basic concept allows 
states to develop oil and gas deposits without prejudice to their respective claims of sovereignty.6 In practice, 
states usually provide for duration and mode of termination of JDA normally 30-40 years. The paper will now 
consider the management of the agreed area.    
4 Management of Agreed Area by the Parties 
4.1 Management of Joint Development Zone 
Usually participating states decide which model of management governs their JDA. However, state practice 
throughout the world and legal writers identified three most common models of joint development arrangements.7 
Furthermore, there are other classifications suggested by scholars, they are all, strictly speaking, different 
variations of the three classifications that now appear to command universal acceptance. 8  Of these three 
classifications, each has its own special features and also has its own peculiar regulatory and licensing approach.9 
As observed by British Institute of International and Comparative Law group of experts, no particular type of 
model appears to dominate the other as: ‘each of these models has a number of possible variations yet none 
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seems capable of commanding universal acceptance due to differing political and economic systems, traditions of 
conflict and degree of national sensitivity’.1  Okafor further stressed that; states should not be held captives or 
slaves of precedents.2      
4.1.2 Single State Management 
As the name implies, it is the simplest model where participating states reached an agreement for one state to 
manage the joint development on behalf of both states, while the other state monitor and share in revenue accrue 
after the managing state’s expenses are settled.3 The managing state applies its own regulatory regime to the JDZ; 
with the other state retain powers of monitoring and inspection of the JDZ apart from receiving a share of the 
revenues.4 However, recognising total authority of one state in the management of JDZ has a lot of political 
implications; therefore, most states nowadays are reluctant in entering into this model arrangement. 5 This model 
was adopted in Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement of 1958 and Qatar-Abu Dhabi Agreement of 1969. 
4.1.3 Joint Venture Management 
Joint venture model represent a system of compulsory joint venture between the participating states or their 
nationals in agreed JDZ.6 The model makes provisions for a compulsory utilisation of transboundary oil and gas 
deposits with the nomination of a single operator on behalf of all participating operators in order to exploit oil 
and gas deposits. The attractive aspect of joint venture to states is that each state will be entitled to nominate its 
own concessionaires to undertake development activities. After such nomination, states are required to ensure 
that their concessionaires enter into joint operating agreement with each other.7  Oil and gas recovered by the 
joint venture will be divided in accordance with the agreement of the states. Each concessionaire’s share will be 
subject to tax and revenues in accordance with the concession agreement in line with fiscal regime of the 
awarding state.8 
The problem usually associated with joint venture model lies as to which laws and regulations in relation to oil 
and gas activities and otherwise will be apply in the zone. Solution to this problem was found in Japan-South 
Korea Agreement of 1974 where provision was made that whichever of the concessionaires was chosen to act as 
the operator in a given block, the state which awarded the operator‘s concession would be such state’s laws that 
will govern the block. However, the solution would therefore, made the choice of operator a matter of so much 
concern for the participating states than it would normally be. 
4.1.4 Joint Authority Management 
Joint Authority model might also be called an interstate joint venture. In this model, neither state has the direct 
responsibility for the management of development of the zone and also nor state has the direct power to choose 
its own concessionaires. In this regard, powers are delegated to a single Authority, which could be called Joint 
Authority for the management of development of the zone and the awarding of concession. States might wish to 
agree to attribute a distinct legal personality to the Joint Authority under the laws of each participating state. 
In terms of management, Joint Authority model is a simple solution, but there might be real reluctance, from 
political point of view, for states to delegate so much power to Joint Authority.9 However, in some instances, 
states leave the role of the Joint Authority as purely administrative, with the authority carrying out duties on the 
basis of policies which have been agreed and set by the two participating states. Classical examples of this model 
are Nigeria-STP Agreement of 2001 and the Timor Sea Treaty between Australia and Timor Leste Agreement of 
2002. 
Joint Authority management model is the most sophisticated and the most complex of all models, having 
elaborated and details provisions which are wanting in other models.10 The focus of the paper will now turns to 
importance and precedents of JDA.         
5 Importance and Precedents of Joint Development Agreement  
5.1 Importance of Joint Development Agreement 
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JDA, its major advantages lie first in the fact that it gives some level of assurance and guarantee to the IOCs that 
their capital investments are not under any kind of risk.1 It also provides the much needed revenue to the states. 
Generating benefits through the establishment of JDZ gives evidently a better chance for states dealing with their 
demand over oil and gas deposits, their economic development and most of all; benefiting from areas which may 
otherwise remain unproductive.2 Nigeria and Cameroon missed the opportunity of establishing JDZ for about 20 
years and now both states recognised the fact that cooperation for joint exploitation of oil and gas deposits 
remains the most viable option. The JDZ therefore guarantees ‘no gain no loss’ solution for the parties concern.3 
It is important to note that the parties have the advantages in the favour of cooperation for joint development as 
the existing JDZ agreements between Nigeria and STP provides much needed experience to work and the 
existing unitisation cooperation between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. These existing arrangements between 
Nigeria, STP and Equatorial Guinea respectively, although experiencing some level of difficulties, prove that 
such sophisticated arrangements can be successfully implemented in the Gulf of Guinea.4 Also, the progress 
made by states in concluding the Gulf of Guinea Treaty and the creation of a Gulf of Guinea Commission by 7 
African states including both Nigeria and Cameroon has done a lot in providing stability and confidence in the 
future of oil and gas exploitation in the region among respective governments and investors in the region.5 
5.2 Precedents of Joint Development Scheme in the Region 
Precedent of JDA in a region is a likely factor to influence the decision of disputing states in that region in similar 
circumstances to enter into a joint development agreement. The ICJ in North Sea Cases suggested that state 
parties should look at the practice of states in the region to see how such problems have been dealt with. The 
Court further stated that all is needed is for the disputing parties to refer to the agreements entered into by the  
neighbouring states of the region with a view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation of oil and gas deposits 
extracted.  
The JDA between Japan and South Korea in 1974 served as a cornerstone for further maritime cooperation in the 
region. Also, in the Gulf of Thailand, joint development agreement between Thailand and Malaysia in 1979 led 
to many successful joint development agreements in the region.  
In case of Nigeria and Cameroon, Cameroon out of urgent obligation to protect its interest took the dispute for 
litigation, which so far has not yielded any fruit with regards to oil and gas deposits in the disputed area as the 
ICJ decision is unfavourable to both parties. The decision made it possible for both parties to look at the Gulf of 
Guinea for precedent of JDA of oil and gas deposits. Indeed, the presence and success of Nigeria and STP JDA 
and Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea Unitisation Agreements served as strong factors for the parties to reached 
agreement in principle for the establishment of JDA. For practicability and benefit of JDA between Nigeria and 
Cameroon, parties must consider the above issues in their best interest. 
6 Conclusion  
The concept of JDA appeared to be in existence through state practice as an alternative means of settling 
maritime disputes where negotiations between parties become deadlock or used in delimited area between parties 
for convenient exploration of joint area for the benefit of parties concerned. In this regard, it offers a means to a 
fair division of the resources at stake, rather than on the determination of an artificial line or concern for parties’ 
rights of exploration in their area of authority. In practice, concerned states usually agreed on the proportion of 
resources based on each party’s bargaining power or strength of claim. The concept allows parties to benefit from 
the resources of the disputed area without prejudice to each claimant’s claim in the disputed area or agreed area 
where boundaries are delimited.    
The value of JDA either in addition to or as an alternative to maritime delimitation is based on the fact that it 
allows investors to invest in the agreed area for the exploitation and exploration of oil and gas deposits for mutual 
benefits of the states concerned. It also strengthens the relationship of the states concerned even in other areas of 
bilateral relationship as indicated in Nigeria-STP Agreement of 2001. 
Nigeria and Cameroon agreed in principle through Mixed Commission for the exploration of oil and gas deposits 
straddling their maritime boundaries as the decision of ICJ did not provide solution to offshore resources despite 
final delimitation for 12 years now. Both parties resorted to JDA now in addition to boundary delimitation in 
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other to cooperate with one another for mutual benefits. This agreement confirmed JDA as an alternative and 
effective disputes resolution mechanism for the exploration of offshore oil and gas deposits in International 
maritime boundary. However, even at that both parties must demonstrate political will in other actual the 
arrangement as demonstrated before between Nigeria and STP in 2001. 
The parties must also agree as to the type of model management of JDA to be adopted as the parties concerned 
are always at liberty to choose the one convenient to them. It is highly desirable, if not mandatory for the parties 
to ensure that the arrangement is not sham considering the importance of oil and gas deposits said to be in 
abundance at the Gulf of Guinea in a bid to achieve energy security now and in the future.   
Finally, this paper, therefore, cannot agree any better with Mensah when he states: 
     In establishing and operating JDA, states are doing 
nothing more than making use of an approach 
which is likely to promote the realization of one of 
the objectives of the convention as stated in its 
preamble, ‘namely, to establish a legal order for the 
Seas and Oceans which will, among others 
‘promote the peaceful uses of the Seas and Oceans 
(and) the efficient utilization of its resource’.1 
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